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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on ongoing research into the potential for rail freight 
service developments to achieve a significant modal shift away from road 
towards more sustainable modes of transport for freight movements.  It is 
based on the analysis of comprehensive databases of rail freight flows in 
Great Britain in 1991 and 1997, a period in which there has been dramatic 
upheaval of rail freight services. This reveals that traffic volumes in early 
1997 were still below those in early 1991, but that many new flows were 
beginning to manifest themselves as a result of traffic gains by the newly 
privatised operators who have been actively seeking new custom.  Some of 
these flows are ones that were lost from rail during the period of decline, but 
it is clear that a significant volume of traffic gained is entirely new to rail. 
Finally, the need for more research on the interactions between these 
supply-side developments and logistical restructuring is highlighted. 
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There is growing concern about the effects of the increasing use of road freight, 
in particular the negative impacts that it has on the environment.  This has led to 
demands for greater use to be made of modes that are less environmentally 
damaging, such as rail and coastal shipping.  This paper forms part of ongoing 
research, for which there are two main objectives.  The first of these is to 
determine the interactions between logistical structure and choice of rail as a 
mode for freight movement.  There have been many logistical changes that 
potentially could affect the modal split decision.  For example, changes in the 
location of activity, the structure of manufacturing and distribution networks, the 
trading relationships between firms and the scheduling of production and 
distribution may all be important factors that influence mode choice for freight 
movements.  Following on from this is the other main objective: to identify 
means by which logistical changes can assist in increasing the share of freight 
moved by rail.  This is of direct importance to rail freight service providers, 
whose survival may depend upon attracting new traffic to their services.  It is 
also of importance to those other parties who are interested in transferring freight 
from road to rail.  These may include environmental campaigners who wish to 
see goods transferred by less environmentally damaging means, local and 
national government departments who are keen to reduce road maintenance 




The main aim of this paper is to report on the analysis of changes in the 
provision of rail freight services in Great Britain since the early 1990s.  This 
analysis will be developed in future research to enable identification of the key 
trends and areas where there may be potential for rail to increase its share of the 
market along the lines recommended by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 1994) which advocates a three-fold increase in 





Prior to considering detailed changes in the supply of rail freight services, it is 
advantageous to provide an overview of the main developments that have 
occurred in recent years, many of which have been influenced by factors external 
to the rail industry.  Figure 1 shows the trends in rail freight volumes since the 
early-1980s, disaggregated into coal and other (i.e. non-coal) movements.  The 
volume of rail freight moved has been in long-term decline since the 1950s, this 
trend largely continuing over the last 15 years though with a shorter-term 
cyclical trend within the longer-term downward one.  The long-term decline has 
been due mainly to increased competition from road and the decline in heavy 
industry, compounded by a lack of interest from British Rail in keeping all but 
the most lucrative bulk traffic on rail.  This concentration on bulk trainload 
traffic is discussed below, but this was clearly not a strategy for rail freight 
growth, or even stability, given that the main bulk markets of coal and steel have 
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suffered contraction, along with certain sectors of the petroleum and construction 
industries in which rail has traditionally had a healthy market share. 
 
The cyclical trend is largely influenced by the state of the British economy, 
which was in recession in the early-1980s and again in the early- to mid-1990s.   
Traffic levels increased in the interim, reflecting the general level of economic 
activity but more particularly the booming construction industry for which rail 
plays a significant role in moving raw materials.  It is quite clear that the 1990s 
trough was deeper than that in the 1980s, emphasising the overriding downward 
trend.  The effect of the miners’ strike in 1984 is clear, when virtually no coal 
movement by rail took place.  This clearly had a major effect on the level of rail 
freight in the 1984/85 period.  It also affected subsequent coal movements due to 
the decline in the number of operational collieries and the reluctance to switch 
traffic back to rail that had been transferred to road.  More recently, changes in 
the power generation industry have led to a substantial decline in the use of coal, 
though a greater proportion of the coal burned now is imported or transported 
over longer distances from domestic sources within Britain.  This has actually 
had benefits for rail volumes, since the decline in tonnage has been offset by an 
increase in the average length of haul. 
 
(Insert Fig. 1 here) 
 
For most of the discussion in this paper, the analysis focuses on non-coal traffic, 
since coal flows differ significantly from other traffic types.  Surprisingly, there 
has been little change in non-coal traffic since 1982/83, though there have been 
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variations.  Specifically examining the latter period, which is that focused upon 
by the original databases discussed later, there was an overall decline in both rail 
freight tonnages lifted and moved between 1990/91 and 1996/97; these years are 
the most comparable ones to the two databases, which are for January 1991 and 
January 1997.  With coal traffic excluded, tonne kilometres actually increased by 
7%, though this conceals the fact that decline occurred at the start of the time 
period, coinciding with the withdrawal of Speedlink services discussed below, 
followed by stabilisation for several years.  The first signs of an upturn in 
business can be seen towards the end of the period. 
 
The 1990s have been a time of significant change for rail freight, particularly for 
wagonload traffic (i.e. less-than-trainload consignments).  Since the 1955 
Modernisation Plan, which led to a major restructuring of all aspects of the rail 
network, British Rail had been focusing on moving freight in block trainloads, 
though with attempts to maintain a wagonload presence through the development 
of the Speedlink network.  Analysis in the late-1980s, however, showed that only 
20% of Speedlink's costs were associated with running trunk hauls, whereas trip 
working (i.e. local distribution) accounted for 50% and marshalling the other 
30% (Rhodes and Shannon, 1991a).  This led to British Rail deciding to 
withdraw from virtually all wagonload rail freight operations. 
 
When Speedlink was withdrawn in 1991 there were over 75 daily trunk services, 
connecting the remaining marshalling yards across the British Rail network.  
Trip workings served over 100 terminals on a regular basis, with a similar 
number handling irregular consignments.  Many locations continued to be served 
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by block trainloads after withdrawal of Speedlink, but in other cases terminals 
closed to rail traffic.  The focus after 1991 was primarily on running trainloads 
directly from origin to destination, with very few wagonload services remaining.  
Trainload Freight was responsible for virtually all flows except Freightliner, 
international and automotive services, these being operated by Railfreight 
Distribution.  
 
The structure of rail freight was radically altered in 1994 when, in preparation for 
transfer to the private sector, the Trainload Freight businesses were reorganised 
on a geographical basis rather than the existing commodity groupings.  Three 
new operating businesses were established, each covering a separate part of the 
British mainland.  Operationally, little change occurred after this reorganisation, 
since most flows operated fairly autonomously.  There was limited scope for 
combining different commodity flows traversing similar routes, but this was 
fairly negligible.  The businesses were offered for sale in 1995 amid controversy, 
since many experts believed that rail freight operators should not have to 
compete with each other, since their main competitor was the lorry.  It was 
argued that economies of scale in rail freight provision should be taken 
advantage of by having one single domestic operator.  Indeed, all three were 
handed over to Wisconsin Central, a U.S. private railroad operator, in February 
1996, to be operated under common ownership as English Welsh and Scottish 
Railway (EWS).  Furthermore, Wisconsin Central had already taken control of 
Rail Express Systems, the provider of Royal Mail services and in 1997 added 
Railfreight Distribution to its portfolio.  Thus, virtually all non-passenger 
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This paper is concerned with the analysis of changes of the considerable changes 
in service provision since the early-1990s and focuses on two databases that have 
been constructed to provide as comprehensive data as possible at the particular 
points under consideration (i.e. January 1991 and January 1997).  This section 
discusses these databases, providing details of the information collected and its 
sources and outlining the suitability of such a method for analysing changes in 
rail freight activity. 
 
The information collected for the databases for each rail freight service was 
gained from a number of sources.  The two points in time were chosen due to 
their significance in terms of the changing provision of services, particularly 
wagonload, and because of the relative ease of obtaining comprehensive 
information.  In early-1991, there was considerable interest in rail freight 
services due to the imminent cessation of Speedlink services and the effects that 
this was likely to have on traffic flows, whereas in early-1997 rail privatisation 
meant that much discussion and analysis of services was taking place in the 
railway press.  The main sources of data included Rhodes and Shannon (1991b) 
and Freightmaster (1997), both of which contain much general information about 
a large proportion of services.  In an attempt to ensure as complete coverage as 
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possible, further sources were utilised, notably the railway press and (for 1997) 
the in-house journal of EWS.  While the main data sources were aimed primarily 






The main information in the databases includes: 
 
• origin and destination of service: to allow analysis of changes in the number 
of points served by rail freight services 
• departure time from origin and arrival time at destination 
• intermediate stopping points for detaching or uplifting traffic 
• service frequency: i.e. number of days per week 
• days of operation 
• commodity/sector: in 1991, flows were classified according to the operating 
sector; 1997 flows have been classified according to commodity, providing 
more detail than sector alone but still allowing comparison between the two  
• nature of service: i.e. whether loaded, empty or mixed 
• operator of service (1997 only): to provide details of post-privatisation 
responsibility for service provision; prior to privatisation, services were 
operated by the different sectors 
• other relevant information: for example, whether or not the service runs every 
day it is scheduled to or only as required 
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Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain complete information for all traffic 
flows that were identified, but in almost all cases the crucial details of origin, 
destination, service frequency and commodity/sector were available.  The 
databases contain information about all freight services, with the exception of 
those operated on behalf of the Royal Mail and those for infrastructure 
maintenance.  The former were excluded due to the difficulties in obtaining 
reliable information for 1991 and the latter are extremely variable in terms of 
their origins, destinations and service frequencies and, in any case, are involved 
in carrying materials for the rail industry itself rather than external customers. 
 
The choice of time periods for the databases was to a large extent dictated by the 
availability of information about traffic flows.  It is believed that the use of these 
two points (early-1991 and early-1997) is suitable for the purposes of this 
research, since the main aim is to analyse changes in the supply of rail freight 
services.   By choosing January in both of the years as the precise point at which 
the database information is based, any seasonal variations in traffic are controlled 
for.  This is an important factor, since many rail freight flows are highly 
seasonal.  For example, power station traffic is far greater during the winter when 
demand for electricity is at its highest, while automotive traffic peaks in early 
summer (prior to August deliveries of new cars).  It is acknowledged that there 
may be other factors that will affect how representative the databases are of the 
overall time period.  By taking specific points in time, there are dangers that they 
will not give a true reflection of general changes between the early-1990s and the 
present day.  Certainly rail freight volumes are affected by external factors, for 
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example the level of activity in the construction industry or changes in the 
storage of petroleum products at customers’ sites.  The effects of many such 
changes are discussed in NERA (1997).  On the whole, though, the main changes 




Comprehensiveness of the databases 
 
More importantly, an attempt has been made to assess the comprehensiveness of 
the databases, as any analysis would be of little significance if they were found 
not to include the vast majority of services.  Table 1 compares tonnes lifted based 
on the summation of the individual entries in the databases with the published 
gross annual statistics.  This comparison is necessarily approximate and relies 
upon a number of assumptions: 
 
• Coal traffic has been excluded, due to the lack of detailed information on 
flows for 1991.  At that time, there were major short-term fluctuations in 
flows between particular origins (mainly collieries) and destinations 
(predominantly power stations), due to the greater number of collieries.  Since 
then, there has been a reduction in the number of operational collieries, so the 
pattern of flows is more stable. 
  
• It was necessary to translate the number of database entries into a more 
meaningful figure such as number of loaded services per week.  The former 
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number is of little use as it does not detail the actual number of services 
operating in a week.  For the majority of services the days of operation are 
fixed, but for a significant minority service frequency varies depending on the 
availability of traffic.  In the case of these services, based on observations by 
the author of freight services in 1997, it has been assumed that they operate on 
50% of the potential number of days for which they are timetabled.  In 1997, 
201 out of 1080 database entries (i.e. 19%) operated on such an ‘as required’ 
basis, whereas in the 1991 database none of the entries operated on this basis.  
The reason for this difference is not clear, though two main factors are 
probably relevant.  The growing commercial awareness in the rail industry, 
particularly of the newly privatised operators, is likely to be leading to greater 
flexibility in service provision now compared to 1991, when services tended 
to operate to a much more rigid pattern.  Secondly, changed  procedures in the 
provision of track access as a result of the formation and subsequent 
privatisation of Railtrack may have resulted in more train paths than required 
being requested by the operators, giving them the option to take up these 
booked paths if traffic flows justify the provision of a service.  The 
establishment of these paths in the Railtrack working timetable makes it easier 
for an operator to run a particular service, rather than having to go through the 
cumbersome procedures to obtain a special path from Railtrack each time it is 
required.  Nevertheless, it is almost certain that some services operated ‘as 
required’ in 1991, so differences in the standard of information may exist 
between these two databases due to the use of different sources of data for the 
two years.  While this may have a slight impact on the accuracy of the time 
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series analysis of the databases, there is unfortunately no way of quantifying 
this degree of error.  
 
• It was not always possible to determine whether or not services were loaded, 
empty or mixed, particularly in 1991 when details of individual traffic flows 
were harder to obtain.  For bulk trainload services, it has been assumed that 
they are loaded in one direction, with the corresponding return working being 
empty.  Due to the nature of these flows, it is extremely rare for loaded 
workings to operate in both directions though where it is known to occur (e.g. 
some steel flows) this has been incorporated into the databases.  For non-bulk 
operations (e.g. Speedlink, Freightliner) all services have been assumed to be 
loaded for the purposes of calculating the approximate number of services per 
week.  These networks for non-bulk traffics do (or did) exist to cater for flows 
in both directions along a route, so the majority of services are likely to carry 
a mixture of loaded and empty wagons, though the relative proportions of 
each will vary from service to service depending on traffic flows and are 
indeterminable.  While many of the trip workings for wagonload services are 
likely to be empty in one direction, the lack of information means they are 
classed as loaded in the databases.  This method of classification is at least 
consistent between the two time periods under consideration and the 
proportion of services involved out of the total number is relatively low. 
  
• To convert from number of loaded services per week to tonnes lifted required 
an assumption on the average payload of a freight train.  Based on recent 
observation, it has been assumed that 500 tonnes is a reasonable 
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approximation of payload.  This takes account of the fact that the main types 
of wagon have capacities ranging from 8 tonnes up to 100 tonnes, with the 
average payload in the region of 30-40 tonnes (Marsden, 1984).  The assumed 
average length of train is 15 wagons, though this again varies considerably 
depending on the commodity and flow characteristics and can range from 1 up 
to 50 wagons.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
This comparison reveals that the estimates of tonnes lifted based on the databases 
actually exceed the published annual statistics for both years.  While this may be 
a result of the assumptions outlined before being inaccurate, it is likely to reflect 
the fact that in some cases individual flows will be counted on more than one 
occasion due to staging of services or re-marshalling en route.  This is 
particularly the case with the jumbo aggregates trains from the Mendip quarries 
to the South East of England, which are split into two or three portions in West 
London for local distribution, and with wagonload flows which may make use of 
a number of different services to get from origin to destination. 
 
The fact that the degree of over-estimation is far greater for the 1991 database 
lends weight to the double-counting argument.  This is because wagonload 
services, with their greater marshalling and trip working (and thus double-
counting of individual consignments), accounted for 32% of all database entries 
in 1991 (i.e. Speedlink services) compared with just 13% in 1997 (i.e. Enterprise 
and Connectrail services).  Enterprise services form the basis for the domestic 
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wagonload network revival, discussed later, while the Connectrail network 
covers the small number of international wagonload services now operating 
through the Channel Tunnel.  Another factor that may account for the higher 
degree of over-estimation in 1991 is the previous assumption that all non-bulk 
flows are loaded.  This may result in the over-estimation of the average payload 
for some of these services, particularly for those where the majority of wagons in 
the train consist are being returned empty and would again have been more of an 
issue in 1991 due to this greater significance of wagonload freight.  
 
Therefore, after taking these factors into account, it appears that the databases do 
provide a good representation of the actual flows at those points in time even 
though the volume estimates are not particularly accurate.  On the whole, 
informal discussions with an EWS representative regarding the completeness of 
the 1997 database flows from, to and within Scotland suggested that the 
overwhelming majority of services were incorporated in that database. 
 
 
Major changes in rail freight services since 1991 
 
This section is concerned with the analysis of the database information.  It 
reveals the extent of changes in commodity flows and locations served by rail 
freight, as well as discussing the effects on traffic volumes of the recent 
developments that have taken place as a result of the privatisation process.  Much 
of the analysis focuses on Anglo-Scottish traffic and flows within Scotland, to 




Disaggregation by commodity 
 
It was clear from the analysis of the comprehensiveness of the databases, 
discussed above, that there has been a decline of 32% at the aggregate level in 
the number of loaded services being operated.  It is possible to disaggregate by 
commodity grouping to allow more detailed analysis, this being shown in Table 
2.  The comparison of commodity types between the databases necessarily 
involved some assumptions being made on the classification of certain services.  
This is due to the reorganisations that have taken place between 1991 and 1997, 
which have meant that traffic flows are no longer allocated to particular sectors.  
However, in virtually all cases it is obvious which of the former sectors the 
service would have been allocated to. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
It is clear that the overall decline has not been consistent across all commodity 
groupings.  The greatest decline, both in relative and absolute terms, has been in 
the number of loaded non-bulk services.  This is perhaps not surprising, given the 
withdrawal of the Speedlink network and subsequent focus on wagonload traffic.  
However, for the main trainload flows there have also been dramatic reductions 
in the number of services operated, with decreases of between (32% and 44%).  
The scale of reduction is far greater than the decreases in tonnages carried for 
each commodity group, primarily resulting from the focus on the core traffic 
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flows.  The operation of many services has been simplified, with more direct 
terminal to terminal flows and less intermediate staging and marshalling of 
traffic, even for trainload flows.  In addition, the introduction of new motive 
power has meant that heavier trailing loads are now possible, such as the increase 
in maximum tonnage from 1,500 to as much as 2,700 tonnes per train for some 
petroleum flows which resulted from the introduction of Class 60 locomotives 
during 1991 (Rhodes and Shannon, 1991a).  The introduction of Class 60s, as 
well as 59/2s, made a huge impact on the movement of bulk products, in some 
cases resulting in a rationalisation in the number of services operated but without 
a decline in tonnage being carried. 
 
The only sector to have shown an increase in the number of loaded services has 
been container, intermodal and automotive traffic.  This covers all services 
operated by Freightliner and Railfreight Distribution.  During the period under 
consideration, the Freightliner network has been rationalised with a reduction in 
the number of terminals served and the creation of a hub at Crewe and the 
number of automotive services has also declined slightly.  The growth has 
occurred in intermodal services through the Channel Tunnel, which were 
introduced in 1995 and have grown at a fast enough rate to negate the losses in 
the other traffics.  It is in the container/intermodal sector, as well as in 






Another key factor in terms of the degree of penetration of rail freight across the 
country is the number of locations served by regular services.  In the 1991 
database, there were 366 locations handling non-coal traffic; in 1997 this had 
decreased to 328, a reduction of 10%.  This information should be treated with 
some caution, as it may not be a true representation of the actual number of 
locations receiving or dispatching traffic.  This is because, in many cases, the 
information sources used for the databases do not distinguish between different 
terminals that are located in close proximity to each other.  There has also been a 
reduction in the number of operational marshalling yards, where traffic flows did 
not actually originate or terminate in any case.  However, this will have had only 
a very slight impact on the number of locations served.  Perhaps more 
significantly, there were many terminals that in 1991 were supposedly still active 
and receiving Speedlink traffic for which no information has been found, so the 
scale of decline is probably greater than the 10% revealed by the databases.  It 
may be possible to determine from other sources the number of additional 
terminals handling traffic, but this has not yet been achieved.  It seems likely that 
many were receiving or dispatching traffic on an ad hoc basis rather than using 
regular timetabled services.  Finally, the reversal of the downward trend in 
volumes had started to result in a small number of additional terminals being 
added to the network in late-1996, so the decline had possibly been more severe 
in the earlier years. 
 
 
The Scottish situation 
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The changes can be seen in Table 3, which shows the number of locations in 
Scotland served by the different commodity flows.  In each case, the total 
number of locations (as defined in the databases) is lower than the sum of the 
individual commodity totals.  For example, in Aberdeen there are currently two 
terminals handling wagonload flows and another terminal for petroleum traffic, 
but these are shown as just one entry in the databases.  The main purpose of the 
table, however, is to show how the number of locations served by rail in Scotland 
has changed.  An intermediate database, for January 1995, was also constructed 
for Scotland to give an additional data series.  Ideally, 1994 would have been 
chosen, since it is midway through the period under consideration, but 
comprehensive data for then were more difficult to obtain than for 1995.  The 
scale of reduction in number of locations served in Scotland has clearly been far 
greater than for Britain as a whole, with a 54% decrease between 1991 and 1997.  
This decrease was concentrated in the early part of the period, with a slight 
increase taking place between 1995 and 1997 reflecting the upturn in traffic that 
has started to emerge, reinforcing the point made above.  
 
The greatest decline in absolute numbers occurred in the non-bulk commodity 
category.  Scotland was particularly hard hit by Speedlink’s cessation, since a 
greater proportion of marginal non-bulk traffic flows than in the other regions 
had remained on rail until 1991 due to the long lengths of haul between Scotland 
and Central and Southern England.  These flows consisted of small volume, often 
seasonal, movements to and from remote and dispersed locations of commodities 
such as grain, chemicals, food products and timber and very few of these were 
feasible for trainload movement. 
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The three bulk sectors (i.e. Construction, Metals and Petroleum) also suffered 
major losses in the numbers of locations served.  In the case of petroleum flows, 
this was due to BP’s reorganisation of movements from its Grangemouth refinery 
after price rises from British Rail, which led to a number of flows switching from 
rail to road in the early 1990’s.  Similarly, the dramatic decline in the number of 
terminals served by metals traffic resulted from British Steel’s decision to close 
Ravenscraig steelworks in 1992.  This led to the virtual elimination of steel 
traffic in Scotland, as well as the loss of inward flows of raw materials to the 
steelworks.  For construction traffic, over half of the terminals have ceased 
handling trainload flows since 1991.  However, two of the terminals that were 
previously served by trainload flows are still receiving flows as part of the 
wagonload network, so are now included in the non-bulk grouping instead. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Overall in Scotland, to a greater extent than elsewhere in Great Britain, there was 
a substantial decline in the number of locations served by rail freight flows, 
though there are the first signs of a reversal in that trend.  This is a result of the 
recent changes that have taken place as a result of the privatisation process for 
rail freight operations, which has started to encourage new trainload flows but, 
perhaps more importantly, has also looked to the expansion of wagonload flows 




Revival of wagonload services 
 
In September 1994, Transrail (one of the three regional trainload freight 
companies) decided to revive wagonload rail freight and consolidate some of the 
smaller trainload flows that it was operating.  This led to the setting up of its 
Enterprise wagonload network, the core network consisting of just 10 trunk 
services per day and with limited geographical coverage.  Examples of flows that 
were incorporated into the Enterprise network included carbon dioxide from Fife 
to London, chemicals from Teesside and Cheshire to Ayrshire, timber from the 
Highlands to Deeside and china clay from Cornwall to Scotland, as well as 
internal rail infrastructure traffic.  This basic network then provided the focus for 
attracting new custom and, by 1997, the network had expanded to cover all the 
major industrial and urban areas of Great Britain, with many of the original 
routes having seen considerable expansion in the number of services provided. 
 
By 1997 there were 46 trunk wagonload services operating each day, with 
around 50 locations served by regular feeder workings and many more being 
served on an irregular or trial basis as traffic volumes expand.  This network is 
therefore still significantly smaller than Speedlink was even in its final days, 
though the rate of growth has been rapid.  Analysis of the databases reveals that 
there were approximately 1100 Speedlink services per week in January 1991, 
with only around 300 Enterprise services per week in January 1997.  The 
majority of Speedlink services were local feeder workings between marshalling 
yards and individual terminals, reflecting the far greater number of locations 




Prospects for new terminals 
 
In Scotland, as Table 3 showed, there are many terminals that were still handling 
Speedlink wagonload consignments, but that have not re-opened to handle 
Enterprise traffic.  At many of these locations the trackwork remains in place and 
the industry that was served by rail is still active, providing potential for greater 
expansion of Enterprise.  There are also terminals that concentrated on dedicated 
services after Speedlink’s demise, but which are now beginning to be served by 
Enterprise trips either in addition to, or instead of, trainload services.  Clearly, 
though, the expansion of Enterprise is not simply mirroring the Speedlink 
network that existed prior to 1991.  EWS has been careful not to attract 
unprofitable traffic, since the main flaw of the Speedlink network was the long 
distance lightly loaded trip workings which accounted for a high proportion of 
costs and was a major factor in its downfall.  On the other hand, Enterprise 
services are now serving locations that have not seen rail traffic for many years, 
such as Georgemas Junction and Kyle of Lochalsh in the Scottish Highlands. 
 
Railtrack has protected 90 sites across its network that it considers to be of 
strategic importance for growing the rail freight business, 16 of which are in 
Scotland (Railtrack, 1997).  In addition, many locations that have lost their 
traffic flows in recent years still have connection agreements, so could feasibly 
see the resumption of services.  In total, there are over 1700 locations across the 
network that Railtrack considers to be suitable for freight, so there is great 
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potential for growth.  Many redundant locations are unlikely to be reused for rail 
freight, however, because they served now extinct industrial developments. 
 
During 1997, there was much evidence of new traffic flows emerging, primarily 
using the rapidly expanding Enterprise network.  While some of the increased 
volume is accounted for by the expansion of existing flows (e.g. some of the 
timber flows) or the attraction of former Speedlink traffic (e.g. light fittings from 
Bodmin), much is new to rail, certainly in the time period under consideration.  
Perhaps the most significant of the new flows are the ones to and from the Far 
North Line, particularly aviation gas heading northwards and the significant 
southbound flow of refrigerators.  The expansion of timber traffic has also been 
rapid and, in many cases, is using locations that have not previously dispatched 
timber, including direct loading of trains on the main line where sidings are not 
available.  Timber is one commodity where significant growth is expected as a 
result of the large areas of forest in Scotland that will reach maturity in the next 
10-20 years. 
 
Growth has been taking place across Great Britain, both in terms of emerging 
wagonload traffic and also new trainload flows.  Many of these new flows are on 
an ad hoc basis and as such differ quite significantly from recent years where the 
emphasis was on operating only regular timetabled services.  As well as EWS’ 
expansion of traffic volumes, Freightliner has recorded an increase in traffic in 
1997.  It has rapidly expanded its services, and indeed its network of terminals, 





Journey time reductions 
 
A significant development that has taken place in recent months has been an 
increase in operating speed for selected wagonload services.  For many years 
now, Freightliner’s container services have been operating at 75mph (120km/h), 
with the new Channel Tunnel intermodal services also operating at this speed.  
Virtually all other freight services, however, have been limited to a maximum of 
60mph (97km/h) or less.  With the introduction in 1997 of a 75mph (120km/h) 
Anglo-Scottish Enterprise service, journey times have been reduced 
significantly.  As Table 4 shows, time savings of around 40% between London 
and Glasgow have been achieved.  This has been due to the greater operating 
speed combined with reductions in marshalling time en route.  This new service 
is only available to certain traffic types though, since most current rolling stock 
cannot operate at 75mph (120km/h).  Much of the growth in wagonload traffic is 
expected to be intermodal, using equipment that can already run at this speed, 
and new wagons currently being considered for other traffic flows will be able to 
operate at 75mph (120km/h).   
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
These time savings mean that rail should be better able to compete with road for 
time-critical movements.  An analysis of recent traffic gains, particularly on the 
Anglo-Scottish routes, reveals that there are flows that are traditionally assumed 
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to be very time-critical.  For example, Safeway successfully undertook trials 
between Daventry and Mossend using intermodal wagons carrying cargoes such 
as wine, mineral water and canned goods, with the establishment of a regular 
service expected in the near future.  This has been followed by Superdrug, who 
have been using rail for the overnight transfer of a wide variety of toiletry 
products between Wakefield and Mossend.  For much of their routes, these flows 
have been integrated with existing Enterprise services, meaning that 
requirements for extra resources and train paths are limited.  These retail 
examples highlight the possibilities for rail to be used for the trunk haul, with 





It is evident that rail freight in Great Britain has being going through a period of 
significant change and it would appear that the prospects for gaining an increased 
market share are better at the current time than for many decades.  This is evident 
from the variety of traffic flows gained during 1996/97, acceleration of selected 
wagonload services and expansion of both the Enterprise wagonload and 
Freightliner networks.  Added to this are gains in traditional trainload flows of 
bulk materials.  Privatisation has clearly had a major impact on the nature of rail 
freight operations but other changes, for example the increased willingness of 
industry to consider rail in the face of  growing pressures on the road network 
and environment, are of importance. 
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For rail to make a significant breakthrough in the movement of time-sensitive 
products, a market in which it currently has a minimal role but which has been 
growing at the expense of the bulk markets, it has to be able to respond to the 
demands placed on it by those who currently use road for virtually all, if not all, 
their transport requirements.  In the absence of significant government 
intervention to discourage the use of road freight, it is only if it can meet these 
demands that it is likely to be able to achieve the three-fold increase in volumes 
that both EWS and RCEP are seeking.  There is little evidence available to 
suggest that recent policy changes in road transport, for example the 6% increase 
in fuel duty per annum in real terms, have had any noticeable effects on the 
modal split for freight movements, though detailed research has not yet been 
carried out to assess any effects.  An improved level of understanding of the 
modal choice decision making processes is required to enable identification of 
the effects of the key logistical trends and of any policy changes aimed at 
influencing the modal split.  This would assist in determining the key areas 
where there may be potential for rail to increase its share of the market for freight 
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Source: DETR, Bulletin of Rail Statistics (1998) 
 






 1991 1997 % change 
Database information (excl. coal):    
Total no. of database entries 1471 1080 -27% 
Approx. no. of loaded services per week 3386 2316 -32% 
Approx. tonnes lifted (millions) (annualised) 81 56 -31% 
Published annual statistics (excl. coal):    
Tonnes lifted by rail (millions) 63 50 -21% 
Tonne kilometres by rail (billions) 11.0 11.3 +3% 
 
Source: DETR, Bulletin of Rail Statistics (1998); original databases 
 














Construction 529 362 -32% 
Metals 633 356 -44% 
Petroleum 314 184 -41% 
Container/intermodal/automotive 696 786 +13% 
Other bulk 119 107 -10% 
Non-bulk 1095 521 -52% 
Total 3386 2316 -32% 
 
Source: original databases 
 








Commodity 1991 1995 1997 
Construction 9 4 4 
Metals 6 1 1 
Petroleum 14 6 6 
Container/intermodal/automotive 2 2 2 
Non-bulk/other 48 20 22 
Total* 72 31 33 
 
Source: original databases 
 
* - total may be less than sum of components due to some locations handling more than one 
commodity type 
 













Mossend (Glasgow) - Wembley (London) 12.75 8 -37% 
Wembley (London) - Mossend (Glasgow) 13.5 8 -41% 
 
Source: EWS, Freightmaster (1997) and  railway publications 
 
Table 4:  Journey time reductions for Anglo-Scottish Enterprise services 
 
 
